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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
EXPANDING THE PROTECTION OF AIDS VICTIMS UNDER THE
FEDERAL REHABILITATION ACT: UNIFYING THE
VIEWS OF COURTS AND THE DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE
The Department of Justice recently issued a memorandum' urging
protection of both symptomatic and asymptomatic carriers of the AIDS
virus2 from discrimination in any federally funded programs, activities,
or employment covered by the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (the Act).3
The Memorandum reversed the Justice Department's previous position
that the Act protected only symptomatic carriers of the AIDS virus 4-
1. Justice Department Memorandum on Application of Rehabilitation Act's § 504 to HIV-In-
fected Persons, released Sept. 27, 1988, reprinted in Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) 195 at D-1 (Oct. 7, 1988)
[hereinafter 1988 Memorandum].
2. AIDS, Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome, is typified by a breakdown in the human
immune system leaving the individual incapable of resisting opportunistic diseases. AIDS is thought
to be caused by the Human Immunodeficiency Virus, or HIV. The Centers for Disease Control
estimate that AIDS has been present in the United States since 1979. 30 Centers for Disease Controk
Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Rep. 250, 251 (June 5, 1981). The virus is detectable by a blood
test. Comment, Prohibiting the Use of Human Immunodeficiency Virus Antibody Test by Employers
and Insurers, 25 HARV. J. ON LEGis. 275, 283 (1988). AIDS develops in three stages: 1) asymptom-
atic but seropositive AIDS; 2) AIDS Related Complex (ARC) in which the symptoms are less se-
vere; and 3) full blown AIDS. In the first stage, the individual has not yet suffered symptoms but is
capable of transmitting the disease. This stage will almost certainly develop AIDS or ARC. Letter
from Surgeon General C. Everett Koop, M.D. to Douglas Kmiec (July 19, 1988) reprinted in 1988
Memorandum, supra note 1 [hereinafter Koop Letter].
AIDS affects the immune system enabling its victims to contract numerous diseases including
pneumocystis carinii pneumonia (PCP), a rare and fatal form of pneumonia, and kaposi sarcoma
(KS), a rare cancer. These diseases, not the AIDS virus, ultimately kill the victim. 30 Centers for
Disease Control. Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Surveillance Rep. 250 (March 31, 1986). As of this
date, no known cure for AIDS exists. Koop Letter, supra.
ARC is less severe than AIDS. ARC appears most frequently in hemophiliacs who received
tainted blood products. The symptoms of ARC may include persistent lymph node enlargement,
fatigue, persistent fever, weight loss, diarrhea, and dementia. Local 1812, American Fed'n of Gov't
Employees v. United States Dep't of State, 662 F. Supp. 50, 52 n.2, (D.D.C. 1987).
3. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. § 795(a-i) (1985)). See infra Part I. The Rehabilitation Act prohibits employers and pro-
grams receiving federal financial assistance, as well as government contractors, from discriminating
against handicapped individuals by reason of their handicap. 1988 Memorandum, supra note 1, § I.
4. In Thomas v. Atascadero Unified School Dist., 662 F. Supp. 376, 381 (C.D. Cal 1987), the
court held that AIDS patients were handicapped within the meaning of the Act because the disease
precluded them from engaging in major life activities. The patient in Atascadero was a five year old
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those persons who display its symptoms and are capable of transmitting
the disease-from discrimination in federally funded programs and activ-
ities. This reversal in policy unifies the federal government's interpreta-
tion of the Act with that of the courts which, despite the Justice
Department's earlier position, consistently interpreted the Act as pro-
scribing discrimination against all persons carrying the virus.5
The Justice Department's opinion provides courts with alternative ra-
tionales for determining that all AIDS victims are handicapped within
the Act's meaning. The rationales further aid the courts in reconciling
previously unexplained or conflicting reasons for the Act's protections.
However, the Department failed to seize this opportunity to address mat-
ters of interpretation within the Act that would have provided courts
with yet more guidance when such questions arise in the future.6
I. THE REHABILITATION ACT
The Rehabilitation Act of 19737 assures otherwise qualified' handi-
capped individuals access to employment and education on a nondis-
criminatory basis.9
As of 1982, section 706(A) of the Act defined handicapped individuals
as 1) persons whose physical or mental impairments limit major life ac-
tivities, 10 2) persons with a record of such impairment,1 1 and 3) persons
hemophiliac suffering frequent pulmonary and middle ear problems as well as chronic lymphade-
nopathy as a result of the AIDS virus. This condition precluded the child's full participation in the
major life activities surrounding school and recreation. Id. at 379.
5. Recently, the courts extended handicapped protection to asymptomatic HIV-seropositive
individuals as well. Although asymptomatic, seropositive AIDS carriers can transmit the disease in
its most severe form as well as the less severe seropositive and ARC forms. AIDS is not transmitted
by casual contact. The virus exists in blood and semen. Intimate sexual contact, intravenous drug
needle sharing, tainted blood product transfusions, and fetal intrauterine infection by an infected
mother are the means of transfer. Note, AIDS and Employment Discrimination: Should AIDS be
Considered a Handicap?, 33 WAYNE L. REv. 1095, 1098 (1987).
6. See infra notes 76-82 and accompanying text.
7. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (1985) (as amended).
8. In addition to qualifying as handicapped as defined in § 706(7)(A)-(B), the Act further
requires that the individual be "otherwise qualified." 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1985). See infra note 62 and
accompanying text. The Supreme Court has determined that even if a contagious individual poses a
significant risk to others in the workplace, he may be "otherwise qualified" if "reasonable accommo-
dations" eliminate the risk of communicating the disease. School Bd. of Nassau County, Florida v.
Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 287 n.16 (1987). See infra notes 24-33 and accompanying text.
9. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1985). See also S. Report No. 1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 37-38, reprinted
in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6373, 6388-89.
10. 28 C.F.R. § 41.32 (1988).
11. 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B)(i) (1985). According to the Department of Health and Human Serv-
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who are regarded by others or themselves as having such an impair-
ment. 2 In 1987, however, Congress amended this definition in the em-
ployment context. 3 This amendment embodied in the Harkin-
Humphrey amendment to the Civil Rights Restoration Act, excludes
from the Act's protection contagious individuals who, because of their
disease or contagion, either "constitute a direct threat to the health or
safety of other individuals," or are unable to perform their employment
duties. 4 Under the Act and regulations issued pursuant to it, an em-
ployer cannot discriminate against an individual because of his handicap
if reasonable accommodation is both possible and effective to eliminate
danger of transmission in the workplace.15
II. HISTORY OF COVERAGE UNDER THE REHABILITATION ACT
Prior to the issuance of the 1988 Memorandum, the Justice Depart-
ment, federal agencies and courts held divergent views on the level of
protection the Act gives to asymptomatic AIDS victims.
Initially, the Justice Department, in a 1986 Memorandum, denied in-
dividuals infected with the HIV virus (widely believed to be the cause of
ices, major life activities include "caring for one's self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing,
hearing, speaking, breathing, learning and working." 28 C.F.R. § 41.31(b)(2) (1988). This defini-
tion includes employment and education. See, eg., Kohl v. Woodhaven Learning Center, 672 F.
Supp. 1226, 1236 (W.D. Mo. 1987) (hepatitis B carrier admitted to federally funded life-skills and
vocational facilities).
12. 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B)(ii) (1985). Persons with a record of impairment include those who
have previously had impairment symptoms but who are no longer symptomatic. School Bd. of Nas-
sau County, Florida v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 277 (1987) (hospitalization established record of im-
pairment). Asymptomatic HIV-seropositive individuals, having never had symptoms of the disease,
do not fall within this category. This distinguishes AIDS from other seropositive diseases such as
tuberculosis and hepatitis B, whose asymptomatic victims have a previous record of impairment.
PRESIDENTIAL COMM'N ON THE HUMAN IMMUNODEFICIENCY VIRUS EPIDEMIC, REPORT (June
24, 1988).
13. 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B)(iii) (1985). The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)
considers persons "regarded as having an impairment" to include 1) victims who have impairments
that do not limit major life activities but who are treated by the HHS as being impaired, 2) persons
who are impaired solely as a result of the attitudes of others, and 3) those persons who have no
impairments but are treated by the HHS as impaired. 28 C.F.R. § 41.31(4) (1988). Courts, viewing
asymptomatic HIV-seropositive individuals as having neither an impairment record nor a present
impairment, justified coverage under the Act if others perceived HIV-infected individuals as handi-
capped. See, eg., Doe v. Centinela Hospital, No. CV 87-2514 (C.D. Cal. 1988) (WESTLAW 81776),
discussed infra note 33.
14. Pub. L. No. 100-259, § 9, 102 Stat. 28, 31 (1988) (amending 29 U.S.C. § 706(7) (1982))
[hereinafter Harkin-Humphrey amendment].
15. Id.
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AIDS) 16 handicapped status if fear of contagion explained the alleged
discrimination.17 Further, neither the Department of Labor (DOL) nor
the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the agencies au-
thorized to draft regulations enforcing the Act, explicitly referred to the
HIV-seropositive condition in their regulations.18 Both Departments
evaded the question of whether programs covered by the Act could le-
gally discriminate against asymptomatic HIV-seropositive individuals,
but implied victims with symptomatic AIDS-those persons displaying
symptoms of AIDS19 -might be handicapped because they exhibit
disorders.2°
Even recently, a June 1988 Presidential Commission report21 did not
definitively state whether asymptomatic HIV-seropositive individuals
were protected under the Act. The Commission concluded that because
neither the Justice Department nor the HIV-seropositive individuals
themselves considered the condition a handicap the Act might not be the
most appropriate vehicle to address discrimination based on this
condition.
22
Despite the views expressed by the Justice Department and agencies,
effectively resulting in no protection under the Act for asymptomatic car-
riers of the HIV virus, courts have uniformaly provided carriers and vic-
16. Selwyn, What is Now Known, I Epidemiology, Hosp. PRAC., June 15, 1986, at 127.
17. Memorandum of the U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Legal Counsel for Ronald E
Robertson, General Counsel, Department of Health and Human Services, 12 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA)
122 (June 25, 1986) [hereinafter 1986 Memorandum]. The Justice Department concluded that
although the Rehabilitation Act prohibited discrimination against a victim displaying disabling ef-
fects of AIDS, it did not prohibit one from discriminating because of a victim's ability to transmit
the disease.
Following the Justice Department's release of its 1986 Memorandum, The American Medical
Association immediately criticized the Justice Department for being influenced by hysteria and for
not using sound medical judgment. The American Medical Association declared "reasonable medi-
cal judgment" should be basis for employment decisions concerning AIDS victims as well as other
handicapped individuals, not the irrational fears encouraged by the Justice Department opinion.
DOJ Policy on AIDS is Wrong, AMA Says, 24 Govt. Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 1023 (1986).
18. Health and Human Service regulations are codified at 45 C.F.R. § 84; the Labor Depart-
ment regulations are codified at 29 C.F.R. § 32. Congress authorized these two departments to draft
regulations implementing enforcement of the Act.
19. Victims of AIDS and ARC manifest symptoms that impair their major life activities. 28
C.F.R. § 41.3 (1988).
20. 1988 Memorandum, supra note I, § II(B) n.8 (citing U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
SERVICES, SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT ON ACQUIRED IMMUNE DEFICIENCY SYNDROME 32
(1986)).
21. PRESIDENTIAL COMM'N ON THE HUMAN IMMUNODEFICIENCY VIRUS EPIDEMIC, REPORT
(June 24, 1988).
22. Id.
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tims of this disease or AIDS Related Complex (ARC) protection under
the Act. While the Supreme Court has not yet addressed this precise
issue, it did consider coverage of seropositive tuberculosis victims in
School Board of Nassau County, Florida v. Arline.23 In Arline, an em-
ployer discriminated against a teacher who previously suffered from tu-
berculosis, was still capable of transmitting the disease, but was at the
time of the discrimination asymptomatic.24 The Court opined that the
relevant analysis for determining whether an individual is protected
under the Act includes two separate inquiries. First, the individual must
have, or be regarded by others as having, a physical or mental impair-
ment25 limiting a major life activity.26 If satisfied, this first inquiry re-
sults in a finding that the individual is handicapped under section 706(7).
Secondly, the individual must be otherwise qualified for the program.2 7
More specifically, the individual must be "able to meet all of a program's
requirements in spite of his handicap." '28 In making this second inquiry,
the Court stated that initially four specific factual determinations must be
made: first, how the disease is transmitted; second, how long the individ-
ual is infectious; third, the severity of the risk of transmittal; and finally,
the provableness of transmittal.29 After making these factual determina-
tions, concluded the Court, a finding must be made as to whether the
employer can reasonably accommodate the employee.30
Using this framework the Court determined that the plaintiff was
handicapped and held that the Rehabilitation Act prohibited the em-
ployer from discharging her unless the employer could prove on demand
that Arline was not otherwise qualified under the second inquiry above.31
The Arline holding unquestionably applies by analogy to AIDS or ARC
23. 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
24. Id. at 280-81.
25. 29 U.S.C § 706(7) (1985). The Department of HHS defines "physical impairment" at 28
C.F.R. § 41.3 l(b)(7) (1988). On the facts of Arline the Court found that past hospitalization because
of the handicap constituted a record of impairment. 480 U.S. at 281.
26. 29 U.S.C. § 706(7) (1985). Major life activities include "caring for one's self, performing
manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working." 28 C.F.R.
§ 41.31(b)(2) (1988).
27. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1985).
28. 480 U.S. at 287 n.17 (citing Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397
(1979)).
29. 480 U.S. at 287.
30. Id. This requirement comes from regulations issued by the Department of HHS, codified at
28 C.F.R. § 41.32 (1988).
31. 480 U.S. at 285.
1989]
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victims because they, too, have a record of impairment.32 Indeed, within
one year of that decision a federal district court in California, relying on
Arline, held that symptomatic, seropositive carriers of the HIV virus
were handicapped within the meaning of the Act.33 The Court, however,
explicitly rejected an automatic extension of its rationale to asymptom-
atic AIDS-infected individuals who do not have a record of
impairment.34
In the absence of any definitive response from the Supreme Court in
Arline, two lower courts have assumed asymptomatic AIDS is a handi-
cap. In Local 1812, American Federation of Government Employees v.
United States Department of State35 a union sought a preliminary injunc-
tion to prevent the Department of State from requiring its employees to
be tested for the HIV virus. Although the district court rejected plain-
tiff's allegation that the testing program violated section 794 of the Act
by discriminating against handicapped individuals with the virus36 the
court did hold that "there is no doubt that a known carrier of the [HIV]
virus... is perceived to be handicapped. ' 37 Further, the court upheld
the Department of State's position that even those infected individuals
who do not yet display symptoms-asymptomatic carriers-are handi-
capped within the meaning of the Act.38 The court did not enunciate a
rationale for its conclusion but instead turned its attention to whether the
handicapped individual was otherwise qualified to perform his job.39 If
other legitimate reasons unrelated to his HIV infection disqualified the
32. See, ag., 1988 Memorandum, supra note 1, II(A).
33. In John Doe v. Centinela Hosp., No. CV 87-2514 (C.D. Cal. 1988) (WESTLAW 81776),
the plaintiff was denied access to a residential drug rehabilitation program because he tested positive
for seropositive AIDS. The California district court stated that to prevail under § 794 of the Act a
plaintiff must establish under HHS regulations that "1) he is an 'individual with handicaps' under
the Act; 2) he is 'otherwise qualified' for the program of benefits from which he has been excluded; 3)
he has been excluded 'solely' because of his handicap .... 28 C.F.R. § 41, subpart C (1988).
The court determined that the defendant hospital perceived the plaintiff as having an impairment
affecting a major life activity: learning. This perception rendered the plaintiff handicapped under
the Act. See 28 C.F.R. § 41.31(b)(4) (1988). Moreover, this perceived impairment-inability to
participate in a learning situation-was substantial because he was excluded entirely from the pro-
gram due to his handicap. 29 C.F.R. § 32.4 (1988). The court denied the plaintiff's motion for
summary judgment on the second and third elements outlined above, but reserved resolution of
those issues for trial.
34. 480 U.S. at 282 n.7.
35. 662 F. Supp. 50 (D.D.C. 1987).
36. Id. at 54-55.
37. Id. at 54.
38. Id.
39. Id.
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applicant, stated the court, the Act did not protect him.'
In Ray v. School District of Desoto County41 a United States district
court sitting in Florida also left unexplained its implicit finding that
asymptomatic HIV-seropositive individuals were handicapped and, thus,
protected by the Act.42 In Ray, children carrying the HIV virus were
removed from school classrooms in both Florida and Alabama. A Flor-
ida district court granted the parents' motion for a preliminary injunc-
tion to prevent the Florida school from denying the children admission
to the school.43 The court based its decision on a determination that the
parents where likely to succeed on the merits of their discrimination suit
which alleged that the Florida school discriminated against handicapped
individuals in violation of the Act." Without discussion, the court cited
Arline in support of its implicit conclusion that asymptomatic carriers of
the AIDS virus are handicapped within the meaning of the Act.4"
The district court decisions in Local 1812 and Ray effectively ex-
panded the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Rehabilitation Act to
provide both symptomatic and asymptomatic carriers of the AIDS virus
with protection. However, these courts did this without providing any
reasoning or support for their conclusion other than the Arline decision.
Hence, as of 1988, the Justice Department, regulatory agencies, and the
courts collectively failed to provide asymptomatic carriers of the HIV
virus with any reliable protection from discrimination under the Act.
40. Id. (finding individual not otherwise qualified for Foreign Service duty).
41. 666 F. Supp. 1524 (M.D. Fla. 1987).
42. Id. at 1530-31.
43. Id. at 1538. The court held, "Unless and until it can be established that these boys pose a
real and valid threat to the school population of DeSoto County, they shall be admitted to the
normal and regular classroom settings, to which they are respectively educationally entitled." Id. at
1535 (emphasis in original). The court relied on testimony of local health officials and an amicus
curiae brief filed by the American Medical Association in determining the children posed virtually
no risk of infecting the other children or teachers by nonsexual contact. Id. at 1530. The court did,
however, require that the Ray children avoid contact sports in school, stringently comply with
guidelines of the Centers for Disease Control, and commit to frequent medical examinations after
which they were required to submit a report to the court. Id. at 1537-38.
44. Id. at 1536.
45. The court reached this conclusion by acknowledging that the children were not sympto-
matic carriers of the HIV virus. Id. at 1533 (finding no. 39). The court then concluded without any
analysis that under the framework provided by the Arline court the plaintiffs were likely to succeed
in proving that their children were unlawfully discriminated against as handicapped individuals
under the Act. Id. at 1536.
19891
Washington University Open Scholarship
634 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
III. THE 1988 DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE MEMORANDUM
In September 1988 the Department of Justice, at the request of Presi-
dent Reagan,4 6 issued a second opinion embracing its views on the Act's
coverage of AIDS-infected individuals.4 7 In the Memorandum contain-
ing its revised opinion the Justice Department effectively reversed its
prior position and endorsed the expansion of the Act's protection to
asymptomatic and symptomatic carriers of the AIDS virus because they
were likely to be handicapped. Perhaps most notably, the Justice De-
partment provided courts with alternative rationales on which they could
both base future opinions and harmonize the previous decisions of Local
1812 and Ray.
According to the Department of Justice, Arline established that symp-
tomatic victims of AIDS and ARC-a less severe form of AIDS-were
handicapped under the Act because both the manifested symptoms and
the necessary hospitalization substantially impaired major life activi-
ties.48 From this premise, the Department split its analysis of the Act's
applicability to asymptomatic carriers between nonemployment and em-
ployment related contexts.
A. Nonemployment Context
Using the two part inquiry set forth in Arline,49 the Department first
found that asymptomatic carriers are handicapped because they are
physically impaired. The Department reached this conclusion by focus-
ing on subclinical manifestations of the infection 50 and the Surgeon Gen-
eral's determination that although HIV-seropositive individuals
outwardly may appear healthy, they nonetheless exhibit detectable ab-
normalities that impair their immune systems.5 1 Furthermore, this phys-
ical impairment substantially limits major life activities of asymptomatic
46. Memorandum for the Attorney General from President Ronald Reagan, 24 WEEKLY
COMp. PRES. Doc. 1007 (Aug. 5, 1988).
47. 1988 Memorandum, supra note 1.
48. Id. § II(A).
49. See supra notes 24-33 and accompanying text.
50. 1988 Memorandum, supra note 1, § II(B)(1). HIV infection results in alteration of the
genetic makeup of 14 cells. Although the infection may remain latent for a period of time, the
infected cells will most likely be activated in the future, and progress into symptomatic AIDS.
Fauci, The Human Immunodeficiency Virus: Infectivity and Mechanisms of Pathogenesis, 239 Sci-
ENCE 617, 618-19 (Feb. 5, 1988).
51. 1988 Memorandum, supra note 1, § 11(B).
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carriers. The Department offered two alternative rationales for this
conclusion.
First, the individual may be substantially limited because he cannot
engage in procreation and intimate personal relations to the same extent
as noninfected persons. The Department of Justice interpreted the list of
major life activities enumerated by HHS52 to be merely suggestive, not
exclusive, of limiting activities.53 Therefore, based upon present medical
knowledge, the Department opined that the major life activity of, for
example, bearing healthy children would be substantially limited for
AIDS-infected individuals because of the risk of intrauterine HIV virus
transmission. Moreover, if an HIV-infected individual should choose to
forego procreation or intimate relations because of his knowledge of the
possible effects of his seropositive condition, the scope of this major life
activity would also be substantially limited.54
The second possible rationale offered by the Department in support of
its conclusion focused on how others react to knowledge that the individ-
ual is infected. For example, even though the disease may not affect the
individual's ability to work, a coworker could nevertheless effectively
limit the individual's ability to work because of a negative reaction.55
Thus, according to the Justice Department, if another person's knowl-
edge of the HIV-infection effectively escalates an insubstantial impair-
ment to one of substantial proportions, the Rehabilitation Act protects
the HIV-seropositive individual.56
After concluding that under either of the above rationales both symp-
tomatic and asymptomatic carriers of the HIV virus are handicapped
within the meaning of section 706(7) of the Act, the Justice Department
52. 28 C.F.R. § 41.31(b)(2) (1988).
53. 1988 Memorandum, supra note 1, § II(A)(2).
54. The Justice Department recognized that not all HIV-infected individuals will react respon-
sibly and that some may not change their sexual behavior. If a court determined that the infected
individual failed to show such regard for his offspring or sexual partners, this rationale for handi-
capped inclusion would not apply. 1988 Memorandum, supra note 1, § II(B)(2)(a).
55. Id. at § II(B)(2)(b). The Justice Department referred to Arline, in which the Supreme
Court determined that an impairment "could nevertheless substantially limit that person's ability to
work as a result of the negative reactions of others to the impairment." 1988 Memorandum, supra
note 1, § II(B)(2)(b) (citing School Bd. of Nassau County, Florida v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 283
(1987)). See supra notes 22-33 and accompanying text.
56. 1988 Memorandum, supra note 1, § II(B)(2)(b). The Justice Department referred to Cen-
tinela, in which the court held that a hospital's exclusion of an asymptomatic HIV-infected individ-
ual from participation in its drug abuse program substantially limited the individual's major life
activity of learning. See supra note 33.
1989]
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turned to the second prong of the Arline analysis: the requirement that
the individual must be "otherwise qualified."' 57  The Department en-
dorsed the Arline Court's holding that before a court can determine if a
handicapped individual is otherwise qualified, four factual findings must
be made with respect to the nature of the disease and the risk of transmit-
tal.58 For example, if an individual poses a real risk of infecting others as
a result of his inclusion in the program or activity, he might not be other-
wise qualified. 59 The ability to discriminate against an infectious person,
however, is tempered by the requirement that the program or activity
administrator be unable to make reasonable accommodation' to elimi-
nate the risk of transmission.61 Consequently, as AIDS progresses, an
HIV-infected individual might suffer substantial limitations in physical
or mental capacities that could not be accommodated reasonably,62 re-
sulting in a finding that the individual is not otherwise qualified.63
B. Employment Context
In its evaluation of whether asymptomatic and symptomatic carriers
of the AIDS virus are both protected from discrimination in the employ-
ment context by the Act, the Justice Department first recognized that
57. 1988 Memorandum, supra note 1, § II(C).
58. See supra note 29 and accompanying text for the Arline Court's enunciation of these four
considerations.
59. For a discussion of the means of AIDS infection, see supra note 5.
60. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. Arline offered two guidelines for determining
when an employer's refusal to accommodate a handicapped individual was reasonable: 1) reasonable
accommodation does not require undue financial or administrative burdens on the employer, and 2)
the employer is not required to make fundamental alterations in the nature of the program. 480 U.S.
at 287 n.17.
61. The Justice Department encouraged reviewing courts to conduct individualized inquiries to
determine the nature and severity of the risk, the probability that the disease would be transmitted
and cause harm, and the degree of potential harm. After thus defining the risk, courts should evalu-
ate whether the employer could reasonably accommodate the employee. 1988 Memorandum, supra
note I, § II(C).
62. The Justice Department recognized the "otherwise qualified" requirement may depend
upon how far the HIV infection has progressed. The DOJ predicted that although safety would not
generally be a concern during the earliest stages of AIDS, some instances may exist in which even at
the onset of HIV infection courts find a significant health hazard not subject to reasonable accommo-
dation. Id.
63. The Justice Department suggests that certain infected health care workers may pose a sig-
nificant threat to the health of others in the advanced stages of their infections. Likewise, persons
having responsibility for the safety of others, such as air traffic controllers, might endanger the safety
of others because of the disabling dementia of AIDS. Id.
It is worth noting that the transmission probability in the normal employment context is slight.
1988 Memorandum, supra note 1, § II(C).
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"handicapped" individuals are defined differently in the employment
context than for other purposes. As a consequence of the recently en-
acted Harkin-Humphrey Amendment, persons constituting "a direct
threat to the health and safety of other[s]" or who cannot perform their
job responsibilities because of a contagious disease or infection are not
handicapped within the meaning of section 706(7). 64 The Justice Depart-
ment regarded this exception as setting specific requirements for deter-
mining who is "otherwise qualified" under the Act in the employment
context.65 This interpretation led the Department to conclude that both
symptomatic and asymptomatic individuals are handicapped under the
Act with the only difference being that in the employment context symp-
tomatic (contagious) individuals cannot pose a direct threat to others and
must be able to perform their job duties.
Further, the Department stated that employers must make reasonable
accommodations 66 to include both symptomatic and asymptomatic indi-
viduals in the work setting;67 before an employer may exclude these indi-
viduals, he must determine whether accommodation is possible and
whether such accommodation would eliminate the danger in employing
the HIV-infected individual.68
In sum, the Justice Department concluded that both symptomatic and
asymptomatic carriers of the HIV virus are handicapped within the
meaning of the Act in the context of both nonemployment and employ-
ment settings. This conclusion was only qualified by the exception that
in the employment context an individual with a contagious disease or
infection must not pose a risk to coworkers and must not prevent him
from performing his job responsibilities.
64. Harkin-Humphrey amendment, supra note 14.
65. 1988 Memorandum, supra note I, § II(B), quoting Senator Harkin and Representatives
Owens and Weiss.
66. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
67. 1988 Memorandum, supra note 1, § II(C). The Justice Department supported its conclu-
sion by looking at the legislative history of the Harkin-Humphrey Amendment and noting both
Congress' awareness of the reasonable accommodation requirement developed by the HHS and
courts and its incorporation of that requirement into the Amendment.
68. The DOJ referred again to the Arline guidelines concerning reasonable accommodation. If
the HIV-infected employee is otherwise qualified and the job's existing personnel policies offers rea-
sonable alternative employment with the same employer, the employer should provide that alterna-
tive employment. For example, a teaching hospital would be required to offer an HIV-infected
surgeon a teaching position in place of his surgery position, eliminating the risk the surgeon might
infect a patient. Limited job assignment flexibility or continued strong risk might preclude reason-
able accommodation. Id.
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IV. COMPARISON WITH CASE LAW
The Justice Department's reversal in position restates what courts and
medical authorities had already determined: no legal or medical reasons
exist for discriminating against AIDS victims. 69 The Supreme Court in
Arline provided the precedent for coverage of symptomatic HIV-infected
individuals under the Rehabilitation Act. Lower courts had specifically
extended Rehabilitation Act coverage to asymptomatic HIV-infected in-
dividuals.7 The Justice Department reiterated and reinforced the pro-
tection previously afforded by these courts and simultaneously provided
them with rationales to support these prior decisions. Additionally, the
Department outlined the relationship between the Harkin-Humphrey
Amendment and the Act. Yet despite these clarifications, the Memoran-
dum failed to address other intricacies in the Act.
The 1988 Memorandum outlined the Justice Department's recom-
mended analysis for treatment of AIDS-infected individuals under the
Rehabilitation Act. The courts in Ray7 and Local 181272 based their
decisions on an assumption that individuals with asymptomatic seroposi-
tive AIDS are handicapped.73 The 1988 Memorandum provides two al-
ternative theories by which one may reach the conclusion that
asymptomatic, like symptomatic, victims have substantial limitations on
major life activities resulting in handicaps: 1) the theory that interfer-
ence with an individual's ability or decision to procreate or have intimate
relations is a substantial limitation of major life activity, and 2) the the-
ory that by excluding an HIV-infected individual from normal life activi-
ties effectively imposes substantial limitations on the individual. 74 Courts
had not previously relied upon the first reasoning in any context and had
only relied on the second as it related to asymptomatic carriers with a
prior history of impairment.7"
Despite the foregoing beneficial results of the 1988 Memorandum, the
69. Justice Department Reverses Itself on Status of AIDS Victims Under Rehabilitation Act, 195
Daily Lab. Rep. (DNA) (Oct. 7, 1988).
70. See Ray, 666 F. Supp. 1524 (N.D. Fla. 1987); Local 1812, 662 F. Supp. 50 (D.D.C. 1987).
71. 666 F. Supp. 1524 (N.D. Fla 1987).
72. 662 F. Supp. 50 (D.D.C. 1987). See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
73. See supra notes 37, 45 and accompanying text.
74. 1988 Memorandum, supra note 1, § II (B)(1)-(2).
75. See, ag., John Doe v. Centinela Hosp., No. CV 87-2514 (C.D. Cal. 1988) (WESTLAW
81776) (perception of federal program administrator that asymptomatic AIDS victim with prior
history of impairment was unable to participate in learning situation resulted in finding that victim
was handicapped). See also supra note 33 for further discussion of Centinela.
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Justice Department failed to take this opportunity to address another
previously unresolved question: When does a limitation on major life
activities become substantial?76 If one person entirely excludes an HIV-
infected individual from participation in a major life activity, that exclu-
sion transforms nondiscrimination into discrimination against a handi-
capped individual. 7 If the limitation results in only partial exclusion
from a major life activity, for example, separated work settings, courts
must determine whether the limitation substantially impaires a major life
activity. Thus, courts must identify the elusive point at which a limita-
tion becomes substantial.
Further, the Justice Department's discussion of an individual's reac-
tion to the knowledge that he is HIV-seropositive is also problematic.
According to the Justice Department, substantial impairment exists if an
HIV-infected individual reacted to his infection by abstaining from pro-
creation or intimate relations.78
This distinction classifies some HIV-infected individuals as handi-
capped while excluding others who, because they lacked normative judg-
ment, did not refrain from engaging in major life activities. Although the
disregard for the health and safety of one's sexual partner is contempti-
ble, poor judgment, ignorance, or lack of conscience are not exceptions to
coverage under the Act. 9
The Justice Department instructed courts to make individualized in-
vestigations in light of current medical knowledge to determine whether
an individual is handicapped. Yet, the Department itself ignored the
available medical opinion of the Surgeon General who concluded that
"persons with HIV infection are clearly impaired" because they "exhibit
detectable abnormalities of the immune system.""0 Had the Justice De-
partment incorporated the Surgeon General's opinion, proof of that fact
alone would classify HIV-infected persons as handicapped. Conse-
quently, the Justice Department lost an opportunity to classify the ability
to live free of the infection as a major life activity.
76. The court in Centinela, No. CV 87-2514 (C.D. Cal. 1988) (WESTLAW 81776), among
others, left open this question.
77. 1988 Memorandum, supra note 1, § II(B)(2)(b).
78. Id. § II(B)(2)(a).
79. Furthermore, the Department of Health and Human Resources considers mental and psy-
chological disorders handicaps. An individual who knowingly transmits the AIDS virus arguably
displays evidence of mental disorder that in itself renders him handicapped. 28 C.F.R. § 41.31(b)(2)
(1988).
80. Koop Letter, supra note 2.
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Finally, although the 1988 Memorandum does not alter the rule that a
handicapped individual who can be reasonably accommodated is "other-
wise qualified," 1 the Justice Department did not clarify what constitutes
reasonable accommodation. 2 Courts in the future will have the Hercu-
lean task of determining what is an undue financial hardship and what
constitutes a fundamental change in the employment program.
V. CONCLUSION
Although the Justice Department issued its Memorandum only after
courts had struggled with the issue of the Act's coverage, the Depart-
ment is to be commended for remedying the absurdity of its 1986 posi-
tion. Previously, the Justice Department considered only symptomatic
HIV-infected individuals to be handicapped under the Act. In 1986 the
Justice Department viewed asymptomatic carriers to be less threaten-
ing 3 to employers in terms of added hardship or expense8 4 than victims
of symptomatic AIDS.8" The 1986 Memorandum allowed discrimina-
tion against asymptomatic HIV-infected individuals although, according
to medical knowledge at the time, the probability of an asymptomatic
HIV infection developing into AIDS or ARC was considered slight.
In the 1988 Memorandum, on the other hand, the Justice Department
finally joined the courts, recognizing that discrimination against HIV-
seropositive individuals is acceptable only if employers have a realistic
fear of contagion that reasonable accommodation cannot eliminate.
The 1988 Memorandum does not altogether eliminate discrimination
against HIV-infected individuals. Discrimination may continue if the in-
dividual is not "substantially limited" in major life activity unless courts
find, after further consideration, HIV-infection manifestations them-
81. 1988 Memorandum, supra note 1, § III(C).
82. See School Bd. of Nassau County, Florida v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 287 n.17 (1987).
83. When the Justice Department issued its 1986 Memorandum, the U.S. Public Health Service
estimated that between 20% and 30% of asymptomatic individuals testing HIV-seropositive might
develop AIDS by the year 1991. Now, the Surgeon General suggests that virtually all infected
individuals will eventually develop the disease. Ray v. School Dist. of DeSoto County, 666 F. Supp.
1524, 1529-30 (1987).
84. An employer can anticipate increased insurance costs, lost hours, and forfeited training
time when employees develop symptomatic AIDS.
85. The report of the President's Commission stressed that added health care costs, customer
preference, and adverse employment action will be insufficient reasons for discrimination against the
handicapped. These added costs and problems do not become evident until an individual shows
symptoms of AIDS. PRESIDENTIAL COMM'N ON THE HUMAN IMMUNODEFICIENCY VIRUS EPI-
DEMIC, REPORT (June 24, 1988) at 11.
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selves represent a substantial impairment. Nonetheless, the Justice De-
partment has taken a significant step toward accepting the medical
profession's view that persons infected with the AIDS virus, including
individuals who are not yet symptomatic, are indeed handicapped.
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